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THE DEFENSE OF INDIGENT PERSONS ACCUSED
OF CRIME IN WASHINGTON-A SURVEY
RICHARD B. AMANDES* and GEORGE NEFF STEVENS"

Eight months before the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Gideon v. Wainwright' the American Bar Association, in accordance
with its long existing concern with the problem of indigent defendants,
authorized the appointment of a special committee with associate subcommittees in each state "to study present practices and to initiate,
coordinate and accelerate efforts to assure adequacy of the defense provided indigent persons accused of crime in the United States... ,,2The
work of state subcommittees was coordinated and directed by the
American Bar Foundation. This article is based upon the report prepared by the Washington subcommittee, and follows in general the form
of the report requested by the American Bar Foundation.'
Each state was requested to provide background information, such
as population, the number of counties and the judicial structure. Relevant data for Washington in the summer of 1963, the date of the
study, included the following: an estimated population of 3,005,100;
and thirty-nine counties organized into twenty-seven judicial districts
of the Superior Court, which is the court of general civil and criminal
jurisdiction. Each district has one or more judges." Each county has
its own prosecuting attorney.5
The factual data for this report was collected from contacts in each
county in the state. In addition, six counties were selected for intensive
study. 6
Judges representing each of the twenty-seven judicial districts and
* Assistant Dean and Robert W Harrison Professor of Law, Hastings College of

the Law, University of California.
** Professor of Law, University of Washington.
1372 U.S. 335 (1963).
287 A.B.A. REP. 468 (1962) ; also reported in 48 A.B.A.J. 988 (1962).
3 The Project Director for the American Bar Foundation was Lee Silverstein. The
members of the Washington subcommittee were Lester Voris, Bellingham, Chairman;
Murray B. Guterson, Seattle; James Healy, Tacoma; Paul N. Luvera, Jr., Mount
Vernon; Theodore D. Peterson, Pasco; and Clarence P. Smith, Spokane. The field
work for the project was done by Assistant Dean Richard B. Amandes and Neal Shulman, then a third year law student and presently a member of the Seattle bar. The
authors were the Reporters for the project.
4For details, see BisE, 7TH ANN. REP., ADMINISTRATORS FOR THE COURTS, STATE
OF WASHINGTON 16-20 (1963). For authority, see WASH. REV. CODE (hereinafter cited
as RCW) chs. 36.04 and 2.08.
5 RCW ch. 3627.
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prosecuting attorneys from each of the thirty-nine counties were contacted, as were attorneys who had represented indigents in the six
counties selected for intensive survey during the period in question,
1962. More specifically, the study included interviews with seven
superior court judges in the six selected counties plus informal discussions with several other superior court judges.' In addition, mail questionnaires were sent to judges in each of the remaining counties. Replies
were received from eighty-five per cent. Five prosecuting attorneys and
the chief criminal deputy in King County were interviewed. Mail
questionnaires were sent to the remaining thirty-three prosecuting attorneys in the state. Replies were received from twenty-two. Since
most of the larger counties were included in the six sample counties,
only two of those responding by mail were full-time prosecuting attorneys.' The remaining twenty are permitted to and do engage in
the private practice of law.' Responses from attorneys from the six
counties were obtained by mail questionnaire and, with the exception of
the smallest county (Kittitas), approximately the same number of
counsel (between 16 and 24) responded from each of the remaining
counties. In toto, responses were received from 101 attorneys who
had represented indigents during the survey year, 1962.
a County
Cowlitz

1960 Population
in Thousands
58

Location in
State
southwest

Remarks
Agriculture; paper and
pulp mills in cities
King (D)
935
west central
Commercial center;
industry; education
Kitsap (D)
84
west central
Agriculture; contains
Naval shipyard
Kittitas (D)
20
central
Agriculture
Spokane
278
east central
Inland commercial
center; light industry
Yakima (D)
145
south central
Agriculture
(D) indicates that a docket study was made.
7
Several members of the supreme court were also interviewed during a judicial
seminar at the University of Washington in the summer of 1963. The seminar dealt
with the same subject matter as our study, the representation of indigent defendants,
as raised by a series of cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on
March 18, 1963. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) ; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) ; Pay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391 (1963) ; Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); and Draper v. Washington, 372
U.S. 487 (1963).
8 RCW 36.27.060. "The prosecuting attorneys of class A counties and counties of
the first class and their deputies shall not engage in the private practice of law." Class
A counties are counties with a population of over 210,000, and first class counties are
those with between 125,000 and 210,000. RCW 36.13.010.
9 Subject to the limitation that he shall not "be engaged as attorney or counsel for
any party in an action depending upon the same facts involved in any criminal proceeding." RCW 3627.050. Callahan v. Jones, 200 Wash. 241, 93 P2d 326 (1939). See also,
CANONs OF PRorassioxAL ETrrcs, Canon 6, RCW Vol. 0.
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Criminal Procedure and the Indigent Defendant. The information
set forth below is a summary of interviews with judges and prosecuting
attorneys in the six selected counties, plus information taken from the
mail questionnaires referred to above. The procedures described are
based upon statutes and court rules in effect during the survey year.
Jurisdiction to try felony cases in Washington is vested exclusively
in the superior court." Informations rather than indictments are invariably used." In King County the prosecutor recalled one indictment
in 1957.
The vast majority of felony cases begin with the arrest of the suspect." In Kittitas and Yakima Counties an information may be filed
and warrant for arrest issued as the first step.' In all of the counties
studied, except King, the first appearance usually is arraignment in
superior court." The Spokane County prosecutor files a justice court
complaint in most felony cases,'1 but then usually immediately files
an information directly in superior court and dismisses the justice court
complaint.' Arraignments in superior court are held daily in Spokane
and Yakima Counties, imnmediately whenever one is needed in Kittitas
1' WASH.

CONST. art. IV § 6 (amend. 28) and RCW 2.08.010.
11 RCW 10.37.010 permits the use of indictments, informations and complaints in
criminal proceedings. See also, RCW 10.37.026. RCW 10.37.015 reads "No person
shall be held to answer in any court for an alleged crime or offense, unless upon an
information filed by the prosecuting attorney, or upon an indictment by a grand jury,
except in cases of misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor before a justice of the peace, or
before a court martial." See also, WASH. CONsT. art. 1, § 25, which permits the use of
the information as a substitute for the indictment.
12 RCW 10.16.010 and 10.04.010. And see, WASH. CRIMINAL RULES FOR COURTS OF
LiMITED JURISDICTION, J. CRIM. R. 2.02.
1' RCW 10.31.010.

'1 But see RCW Ch. 10.16 Preliminary Hearings, and particularly RCW 10.16.030,
10.16.040, 10.16.070, 10.16.080 and 10.16.130.

15 WASH. J. ClM. R., 2.01-2.02.

16 The validity of this practice today is questionable. Under Washington law, as
indicated in note 11, supra, the prosecuting attorney has an election to proceed by an
information filed in superior court, or by a complaint filed in justice court or before a
justice of the peace. If the prosecutor elects to start by the complaint route, the Washington Supreme Court Rules for Courts of Limited Jurisdiction, specifically WASH.
J. CRier R. 2.03 (e) (2) provides that defendant has a right to a preliminary examination, and WASH. J. CRIM R., 2.03(f) provides for waiver of this right only by the

defendant. The reason why a defendant arrested under the complaint procedures is entitled to a preliminary examination is because the arrest procedures under this approach
do not require preliminary investigation by any branch of the judicial machinery. The

purpose of the preliminary examination is to look into the question of probable cause
to believe that an offense has been committed and that the person arrested has committed it. The preliminary hearing is not employed under indictment procedures because the grand jury has performed that function, nor is it employed under information
procedures because the prosecuting attorney has made the necessary preliminary investigation. Where, however, the prosecuting attorney elects to start by the complaint
route, and has taken advantage of that approach to place the defendant in custody, he
should not be allowed to deprive defendant of his rights under the Rules and to avoid
the preliminary examination by filing a complaint in superior court.
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County, but only weekly in Kitsap (Mondays) and Cowlitz (Thursdays) Counties." In King County the first court appearance is usually
at a preliminary examination before one of five justices of the peace,
all of whom are attorneys.1 8 Since no provision exists for compensating
counsel at any level below that of superior court, no mention is ever
made of providing counsel at county expense. 9 A defendant may or
may not be informed of his right to counsel at his first appearance after
arrest upon the warrant.2 0 A bail schedule exists in King County and
is generally followed.' In other counties, informal schedules exist,
often no more than providing the "usual" bail for a "typical" felony,
subject to alteration for lesser or more serious crimes, or the personal
circumstances of the accused.22
First appearances in King County before a justice of the peace usually take place within thirteen to twenty-four hours after arrest.2 Pre'. RCW 10.40.010.
28 The King County Prosecuting Attorney's Office uses the complaint approach. See
WAsH. J. Cimi R. Chap. 2.
'sRCW 10.40.030 requires the superior court to inform a defendant without counsel
at arraignment of his right to counsel, and, if indigent, of his right to counsel at public
expense. If the proceeding is before a Washington court of limited jurisdiction, under
the complaint procedure, the judge must inform the defendant that he has a right to
counsel at the preliminary hearing. WAsH. J. Ciati. RK, 2.03(e) (2). Some Washington
justice court judges are appointing counsel for indigents at this stage even though no
Washington statute, such as RCW 10.01.110, presently provides for payment of such
appointed counsel at public expense. It seems clear in the light of Hamilton v. Alabama,
368 U.S. 52 (1961) and White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) that the preliminary
examination is "a critical stage in a criminal proceeding" and that the indigent defendant
must, therefore, be provided with counsel at that time if he wants one. See also, In re
Pettit v. Rhay, 62 W.2d 515, 383 P.2d 889 (1963). Furthermore, by virtue of the interpretation of WAsH. CoxsT. art. 1 § 22 (amend. 10) in McClintock v. Rhay, 52 Wn2d
615, 328 P.2d 369 (1958), that an accused person is entitled under this constitutional
provision to have an attorney appointed at public expense if he is without funds, the
court should require payment of lawyers so appointed. Chap. 133, Laws of 1965 (S.B.
No. 61), which will become effective 10 June 1965, provides for appointment of counsel
at time of defendant's first appearance, or possibly earlier, and for payment of a reasonable fee and reimbursement of actual expenses necessarily incurred.
20 But see, WAsH. J. Cani R. 2.03(e) (2), and RCW 10.40.030. The statutes covering
preliminary hearings, RCW Chap. 10.16, do not require the judge to tell the accused of
his right to counsel. It would seem, under the reasoning of Hamilton v. Alabama, 368
U.S. 52 (1961); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964), that in this respect the statutes do not measure up to constitutional
requirements.
21 A new approach to bail in Washington came into existence with the promulgation
of the Washington Supreme Court Rules for Courts of Limited Jurisdiction in 1963.
See WAsH. J.Cnm-. R., 2.03(a) and 2.03(b), which were drafted to implement WAsH.
CONST. art. 1, § 20 and § 29. The new rule with respect to bail is both a codification of
the best and an extension into better practices than were previously available under
Washington statutes. The Superior Court of King County is also experimenting with a
wider use of the release on one's own recognizance. Attention should also be directed
to the possibility of the avoidance of bail problems by a wider use of the summons in
criminal cases as authorized by WAsH. J. Ceium. R., 2.02.
22 See note 21 supra.
2s RCW 10.16.010 requires the arresting officer to bring the person arrested before a
magistrate "forthwith" The statute does not define the term "forthwith." See also
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liminary hearings are also used regularly in King County where the
prosecutor generally makes a full presentation, rather than just enough
evidence to bind the defendant over to superior court.24 The prosecutor
thus uses the preliminary hearing to test the strength of his case. Elsewhere in Washington, preliminary hearings are rarely held. In Cowlitz
county an analogous informal proceeding is used by the prosecutor in
questionable sex cases "in an attempt to save the accused from unjustified publicity." (Newspaper reporters do not cover those proceedings.)
The first appearance in counties other than King, arraignment, usually occurs within twenty-four hours of arrest in Kittitas, Spokane, and
Yakima Counties, but takes place perhaps as much as a week after arrest in Cowlitz and Kitsap Counties due to the weekly arraignment
calendar.25 In King County, where a first appearance in justice court
and a preliminary hearing both usually precede the filing of the information, from four to five weeks commonly elapse before arraignment
on the information. Arraignment in the above context means first
appearance after the filing of the information.26 If the accused is without counsel at this time, counsel is then appointed for indigents, usually
from a list of the attorneys in the county, who are seldom present in
court when appointed. The case is put over a week, or for such lesser
or additional time as counsel may desire, before the accused's plea is
entered. 28 The presiding judge in King County at the time of the
survey appointed as counsel for indigents only those who had requested
such appointments and only if they were present in court upon arraignRCW 10.04.010. WASH. J. CLM. R., 2.03(a) requires an officer making an arrest under
a warrant with bail fixed thereto to take the person "directly and without delay" before
a judge or person authorized to take bail; Rule 2.03(b)(1) requires an officer making
an arrest without a warrant or on a warrant where bail has not been fixed thereon to
take the person to the county or municipal jail, and, if his physical condition warrants,
and the offense is bailable, to permit him to deposit bail as soon as practicable; Rule
2.03(d) defines "directly and without delay" as "as soon as reasonably practicable." The
Washington Judicial Council, in its original recommendations to the supreme court, had
recommended a more specific time schedule. Considering the reasoning of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), there would
seem to be no reason whatsoever for the arresting officer to delay bringing the arrested
person before a magistrate or person authorized to accept bail. On the contrary, failure
to do so may make eventual conviction of a person who did in fact commit a crime either
more difficult or even impossible.
24 See note 18 supra.
25 For bail procedures, see note 21 supra, and RCW Ch. 10.19.
26 B1t see RCW 10.40.010.
27

RCW 10.40.030.

RCW 10.40.060 specifies that the defendant is entitled to one day after arraigmnent
in which to answer if he demands it. WASH. J. CLM. R., 2.03(e) (4) provides that the
judge at the preliminary hearing shall allow the defendant reasonable time and opportunity to consult counsel. See also, State v. Hartwig, 36 Wn.2d 598, 219 P2d 564
(1950), holding that the right to have the assistance of counsel carries with it reasonable
time for consultation and preparation.
28
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ment. Appointed counsel then conferred with the accused, entered a
plea of not guilty, and was encouraged to return with the defendant
for a change of plea, if such was to be forthcoming, as soon as practicable." Other King County judges also select counsel from a list of
those who have requested such appointments, but do not require that
they be present in order to qualify. With these other judges, the defendant's plea may be made at any reasonable time.
As is to be inferred from the above discussion, the appointed counsel
system is employed throughout Washington, with one exception. The
Benton-Franklin Counties Judicial District in 1963 appointed a public
defender to be paid from county funds. This plan is still in operation.
A report on the success or failure of the experiment will no doubt be
made to the Washington Judicial Conference and to the Washington
State Bar Association in due course.
If the accused is without counsel at either a preliminary hearing
before a magistrate or at arraignment before a superior court judge,
the magistrate or judge is required to inform the accused of his right
to counsel."0 The Washington Supreme Court has held that while
"There are no 'magic words' which fit all situations as to what the trial
court must say in advising an accused person of his constitutional
rights," 1 constitutional guarantees and Washington statutes impose
upon the court three duties: ...
(1) to inform the defendant that it is his right to have counsel before being arraigned;
(2) to ascertain whether because of the defendant's poverty he is unable
to employ counsel, in which event the court must inform the defendant
that the court shall appoint counsel for the defendant at public expense if
he so desires; and
2
(3) to ask whether the defendant desires the aid of counsel.8
To determine eligibility of the indigent for appointment of counsel,
the judge asks a series of questions about his financial status. Usually,
this is the only test employed. In one or two counties, the judge will
29 For steps available to defendant at arraignment see RCW 10.40.060 through
10.40.190.
soWAs
H. J. Cra. R. 2.03(e)(2); RCW 10.40.030, and 10.01.110. See also WAsH.
art. 1, § 22 (amend. 10).
CoNsT.
31
In re Ritchie v. Rhay, 63 Wn2d 508, 387 P2d 967 (1963).
32 Ibid.
3
8 Although not directly in point, since it involves costs of perfecting an appeal, the
language of State v. Rutherford, 63 Wn.2d 949, 953-54, 389 P.2d 895, 898-99 (1964),
should serve as a helpful guide:
1. Indigency is a relative term, and must be considered and measured in each case
by reference to the need or service to be met or furnished.
2. Consideration must, of necessity, revolve about and be given to the existence,
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then ask the prosecutor if he's satisfied that the accused is indigent,
and if the prosecutor indicates a desire to pursue the matter further,
he may-but this rarely happens. Counsel is then appointed. One judge
in a small county indicated that for young, old or mentally infirm
defendants, he automatically appoints an attorney and asks him to
report regarding the defendant's financial situation. The only time
an affidavit is regularly employed in determining indigency is in Spokane County when counsel is requested for an appeal. The judge then
requires the defendant to certify that he is without funds.
As mentioned above, there is no provision for compensation of counsel appointed to represented indigent defendants except in felony cases
in superior court.34 . A Washington statute provides for compensation
not to exceed twenty-five dollars a day for each lawyer (a maximum
of two is allowed) for each day of trial and twenty-five dollars for
services in preparing for trial or plea. 5 There is some difference among
judges in the interpretation of this provision. Some allow $25 through
the first day of trial, most allow $25 to the first day of trial (plus of
course $25 per day thereafter). In Cowlitz and Kitsap Counties the
judges allow $50 as the basic fee for a guilty plea. In addition, Cowlitz
County may allow more than $25 per day for additional trial days.
Pierce County judges allow an average fee of $75, $25 each for arraignment, plea and sentencing. No provision is made for compensation at
an earlier stage of the proceedings than arraignment (although one
superior court judge during the period of the survey requested a judge
of the justice court to appoint counsel, and indicated that he "would
find a means of reimbursing counsel somehow"). Similarly no provision
is made for reimbursement of investigatory or out-of-pocket expenses
other than the $25 for preparation, nor for compensation on appeals
to the supreme court, although several counsel indicated reimbursenature and extent of (a) the defendant's separate and community assets and liabilities; (b) the defendant's past and present occupation and earning capacity; (c) the
defendant's credit standing; and (d) any other factors tending to substantially impair or materially enhance the defendant's ability to advance or secure the necessary
costs.
3. Mere innuendo, suspicion, or conjecture that a defendant may be able to secure
or advance the costs is insufficient.
See also Carter & Hauser, The Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 36 F.R.D. 67 (1964).
34 See text accompanying note 19 supra. Ch. 133, Laws of 1965 (S.B. No. 61) provides that the section shall apply to "other proceedings" as may be constitutionally
required. This is broad enough to cover misdemeanors if defendants so charged are
held constitutionally entitled, as indigents, to appointed counsel.
35 RCW 10.01.110. This statute has been superseded by legislation enacted by the
1965 legislature and signed by the Governor which provides for the payment of reasonable attorney fees and actual expenses necessarily incurred. S.B. 61. Laws of 1965,
Ch. 133, effective 10 June 1965.
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ment for the former, and most judges and attorneys indicated some
compensation had been paid for the latter. However several counsel
indicated that they received no compensation for their work on appeals
"because there is no statutory provision for it.""8 All judges interviewed indicated that psychiatrists and other doctors are provided at
state expense where it seems appropriate." Their compensation comes
from the witness fee fund, although it is doubtful whether that fund
was intended to cover such fees.
As a general rule counsel is not provided for indigents charged with
misdemeanors in any of the counties sampled, although if a serious
misdemeanor is to be tried in superior court, appointment may be
made."8 In four of the selected counties counsel is usually not appointed
for a defendant charged with a felony if he pleads guilty, the plea
being regarded as a waiver of counsel."9 Counsel will be appointed at
"° If a defendant
that stage in all counties if the defendant requests it.
has been convicted, his counsel is always present at sentencing. 1 Most
judges in the selected counties do not appoint counsel for a probation
revocation hearing. 2 However, some of those who do not appoint counsel have some qualms about the fact that they have not done so. Either
the judge or prosecutor in each of the six counties indicated that counsel
is provided for sexual psychopath hearings, whereas it is usual in only
three of the counties (King, Kittitas and Spokane) to appoint counsel
30
Rule 10124W, R. WAsH. PLFAD., PRAc.& PRoc., provides that whenever the trial
judge authorizes the expenditure of county funds on behalf of an indigent defendant to
perfect a review to the supreme court, he shall at the same time appoint an attorney to
represent the defendant unless the defendant already has counsel. The Washington
Judicial Council has sponsored a bill to provide compensation for and reimbursement
of expenses to attorneys who are appointed to handle the appeals of indigent defendants
for37several years. The effort has finally borne fruit. See S.B. 61, supra note 50.
This, of course, is in addition to defendant's right to compulsory process to compel
the attendance of witnesses in his behalf. WAsH. CoNsT. art. 1, § 22 (amend. 10). For
witness fees, see RCW Ch. 2.40, and RCW 10.01.130, 10.01.140, 10.46.050 and 10.52.040.
See also, RCW Ch.10.55, Witnesses Outside the State (Uniform Act).
38 This practice should be extended in view of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963).
And see, note 19 .supra.
3
9The validity of this practice is very questionable, unless preceded by the procedures
outlined in the text at note 30. See, e.g., such waiver cases as State v. Dechmann,
51 Wn2d 256, 317 P2d 527 (1957) ; Wakefield v. RIhay, 57 Wn2d 168, 356 P2d 596
(1960); State v. Angevine, 62 Wn2d 980, 385 P.2d 329 (1963); and, Ritchie v.
Rhay, 63 Wn.2d 508, 387 P2d 967 (1963). See also Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478,
at 490 n. 14 (1964).
40 RCW 10.01.110.
41
The defendant must be present for conviction of an offense punishable by imprisonment. RCW 10.64.020. The defendant is entitled as a matter of right to have counsel
present both when the jury returns its verdict and when sentence is pronounced; he
may also waive this right State v. Washington, 39 Wn2d 517, 236 P.2d 1035 (1951) ;
and In re Eskridge v. Rhay, 58 Wn2d 556, 364 P2d 819 (1961). Annot., 20 A.L.R. 2d
1240 (1952).
42 See, in support of the validity of this practice, It re Jaime v. Rhay, 59 Wn.2d 58,
365 P.2d 772 (1961) and State v. Shannon, 60 Wn2d 883, 376 P2d 646 (1962).
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in the commitment of the mentally ill, although a guardian, often an
attorney, may be appointed to look after the estate of the person
committed.4"
If an appeal is requested, trial counsel usually continues through the
appellate process. In fact, one judge insists that counsel retained for
the trial continue as appointed counsel on appeal. However, for good
cause, trial counsel may be relieved and other counsel appointed for
appeal.
The usual post conviction remedy in the State of Washington is habeas corpus.4" Petitions may be filed in the superior court of the county
where the prisoner is incarcerated" or in the supreme court.4" At present counsel is not provided for those incarcerated in the reformatory
or penitentiary who want to take postconviction action in either the
superior or supreme court.4 A superior court judge in Walla Walla
County, where the penitentiary is located, suggested that he would
favor appointing counsel in some habeas corpus cases, if a constitutional screening process can be devised. The judge in the county containing the reformatory presents an opposite philosophy. He felt that
habeas corpus petitions should not be encouraged, and that we must
assume the accused had a fair trial. One prosecutor indicated that
prisoners often prefer not to have counsel appointed; they say that they
can do a better job themselves. One deputy attorney general is assigned
to present all habeas corpus petitions before the supreme court, more
or less as an impartial evaluator, rather than as an advocate. A member
of the Washington Supreme Court indicated he could not remember
the last time an indigent had been represented by counsel on habeas
corpus before that bench. 8
Comments of Judges, Prosecuting Attorneys, and Attorneys Who
Have Represented Indigents, Regarding Criminal Procedure in
Washington. The views expressed below, as well as much of the factual
48

For an excellent discussion of the problems of this area see LINDMAN & MCINTYRE,

THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND

THE LAW,

(1961), a study conducted under the supervi-

sion of the American Bar Foundation.

44 RCW Ch. 7.36, and WASH. CONST. art. 1 § 13.
45 RCW 2.08.010, WASH. R. PLEAD., PRACT. PROC.,

96.08W, and WASH. CONST. art.
4, § 6 (amend. 28). For an excellent example of the use of habeas corpus, see In re
Pettit v. Rhay, 62 Wn.2d 515, 383 P.2d 889 (1963).
48 RCW 2.04.010, WASH. Sup. CT., R. oN APPEAL, 56, RCW Vol. 0, and WASH.
CONST. art. 4 § 4.
47 That this practice is presently widely followed, see Comment, Right to Counsel in
Criminal Post-ConvictionReview Proceedings,51 CALIF., L. REV. 970 (1963). For an
example of contrary practice and reasons see, Mazor, 77Te Right to be Provided Counsel: Variationson a Familiar77zeme, 9 UTAH L. REV. 50, 72-74 (1964).
4S Contra, In re Pettit v. Rhay, 62 Wn.2d 515, 383 P.2d 889 (1963).
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data referred to above, were obtained by means of interviews and mail
questionnaires. In addition to requesting answers to specific questions
dealing with many particular aspects of criminal procedure, each interviewee was presented with an open ended question at the beginning
and at the close of each interview, designed to elicit his basic thoughts
and feelings regarding criminal procedure. Each mail questionnaire
presented a similar opportunity and a significant number of responders
in all categories took the opportunity to express themselves generally
on the subject of criminal procedure as it existed in 1963. Because
many of these comments deal with the specific items discussed above,
some repetition of subject matter is inevitable. However, an effort has
been made to cover comment and opinion, as distinguished from fact.
Indigency.9 On the basic question, "Who is an indigent?," judges
and prosecuting attorneys were presented with a list of eight factors
and asked whether or not any of the eight were taken into account in
determining indigency. These factors were:
1. Wages or salary of the accused.
2. Ownership of an automobile or other personal property.
4
9 The following table indicates the extent of the problem faced by the six counties
studied in depth:
0

0

ot 4
O

"o

County
Cowlitz
King
Kitsap
Kittitas
Spokane
Yakima
a)These

90
1010
134
57
592
292

P
80
50
45
55
80
80

E

P

Z

4F
30
5
15
57
25
25

'~6

It~

39
1705
45
12
388
125

49
468b
60b
16b
124
135b

19
87
28
3
112
48

6-9
30
6
6
2
6

$50
25
50
25
25
25

figures are averages of the estimates of judges and prosecutors in each county.
(These figures are estimates based on the response of attorneys. The specific figures for Cowlitz and Spokane were obtained from a docket count.

It will be noted that consistency with respect to estimates of percentage of indigency
and waiver of counsel is not particularly apparent. Judges' estimates on both factors
varied widely. There was no apparent pattern between rural and urban areas, nor between the estimates of junior and senior judges. (Judges who had been on the bench
for less than ten years were considered junior; those with more than ten years of
judicial experience in superior court were considered senior). Estimates on the percentage of indigency ranged from 33% to 95%, and on waiver of counsel by indigents from
2% to 85%. The averages were a 611o rate of indigency and a 31% rate of waiver.
Similarly, the prosecuting attorneys' estimates of the percentage of indigent defendants,
charged with felonies, varied widely with no observable pattern between rural and urban
areas. Estimates on the percentage of indigency ranged from 15 to 98, and on waiver
of counsel by indigents from 0 to 50%. The averages were close to those of the judges,
a 61% rate of indigency and a 26% rate of waiver.
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Ownership or interest in real property.
Any stocks, bonds or bank accounts.
Any pension, social security or unemployment compensation.
Was he out on bail.
The financial resources of parents or spouse.
Financial resources of other relatives.

Virtually all of the judges indicated that they considered all eight
factors. However, several judges stated that they did not include items
6 and 8. The answers of a great majority of the judges indicated that
no single item standing alone would preclude a finding of indigency.
Approximately one-third of the judges indicated that the financial resources of the defendant's spouse were considered and might prevent
a finding of indigency, but several of them indicated that the issue had
never arisen.
Prosecuting attorneys were asked specifically what they thought of
the present system for determining indigency. Eight of the twenty-eight
felt that the present system was too lenient. On the other hand, three
from smaller counties (two of which had less than ten thousand population) said that the system was too strict.
No judge interviewed in this study felt that a defendant who could
pay a moderate fee should have counsel appointed. The consensus was
that he could find an attorney to defend him for that fee, even though
it be little more than that provided by the state. Several judges indicated that they felt it an obligation of the Bar to handle such cases
for whatever fee was available. On the other hand, at the judicial
seminar at the University of Washington in the summer of 1963, there
was strong indication that all doubts should be resolved in favor of
a finding of indigency and that a man who is just barely managing to
get by on his pay check, though he have a small equity in his home,
should have counsel appointed for him.5" As a practical matter, several
judges felt that appointed counsel would be and usually are the ones
most likely to discover available funds. In that circumstance, in at
least two counties, counsel seek no funds from the county and collect
from the defendant. In one county it appeared that at least some
counsel collected from the county if there was a difference between
what they would have charged and what they had been able to collect.
A few attorneys felt that because they had been appointed they were
5OAccord: Report of the Judicial Conf. of the U.S. on the Criminal Justice Act,
1964, 85 Sup. Ct. 12 (1965).
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ethically estopped from receiving any money from the defendant who
had not selected them, even though they were unable to collect from
the state because their client was not indigent."
Indigency having been established, all the judges interviewed indicated that they explained the significance of the arraignment and informed the accused of the fact that he is entitled to counsel at no cost
to him. 2 In addition, judges in Kitsap and King County urged, or
virtually urged, the acceptance of counsel. All the judges were in
agreement that a defendant under twenty-one must accept counsel,
whether he wants it or not.5
Should the defendant be found ineligible to have counsel appointed,
most judges merely tell the defendant that, if he wishes, he may and
should retain his own lawyer. 4 The interviews produced a further
statement that the accused is given a reasonable time to employ counsel,
if he so desires. 5 One judge indicated that a week was usual but that
he would balk at a month.
Sources of Appointed Counsel. Counsel for indigents in Washington
are almost invariably selected from a judge's list of attorneys' names.
In the vast majority of cases, this list includes the names of all the
attorneys in the county, subject to exceptions for age, infirmity, etc.
King County is an exception to this rule, as explained above. At the
time of the study, King County was contemplating an attempt to
broaden the list from which attorneys were to be selected, as a result
of an inquiry into this subject by the federal district judges in western
Washington and the appointment during the latter part of the summer
of 1963 of some of Seattle's leading attorneys to represent indigents.
By the time the original report of this study was presented to the
American Bar Foundation, in the latter part of 1963, the federal court
had commenced making its appointments from a list which included
all King County attorneys who had been admitted to the Washington
Bar during the preceding twelve years. 6 Since the period of the study,
51

There are bar association ethics committee rulings to this effect. See DINKma,

ETHics 62-63 (1953), which includes a suggested solution.
See text at notes 30 & 31 supra.
For an excellent discussion of the waiver point see State v. Angevine, 62 Wn2d
980,5 986-87, 385 P.2d 329, 333 (1963) ; annot., 71 A.L.R. 2d 1160 (1960).
4 WAsH. CONST. art. 1, § 22 (amend. 10) assures the right of the accused to appear
and defend in person if he so desires after having been adequately advised of his right
to counsel under his particular circumstances.
LEGAI.
52
53

55 See note 28 supra.

6 This practice is presently under review by the Federal District Court because of
the new Criminal Justice Act, which became law on 20 August 1964 Pub. Law 88-455,
18 U.S.C. 3006A, and which provides for compensation of assigned counsel in criminal
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and at present, the King County superior court has made, and is making, its appointments from a list of attorneys prepared by the SeattleKing County Bar Association. The list contains the names of attorneys
who volunteered, as well as those who were drafted for service by the
bar committee. Presence in court is not required. The superior court
judges use the list not only as a source of names for appointment, but
also as a means of equalizing the burden on the bar. The Kittitas
County list includes only three of the county's ten lawyers in private
practice. This is the result of an agreement between the bench and
bar under which one attorney from each of the law firms in the county
is assigned the responsibility of defending indigents accused of crime.
Cowlitz County has had a problem arising out of an ethics opinion
issued by the Washington State Bar Association, which states that
it is unethical for an attorney who serves as a city attorney to accept
the defense of persons accused of crime in superior court, and that
partners and associates of the city attorney are also disqualified."
In a county with only thirty-nine practicing lawyers, this opinion resulted in a very serious limitation on those available to represent indigents. It put the entire burden on some twenty lawyers. The superior
court judges of Cowlitz County have wanted to appoint city attorneys
or their associates, only to encounter this ethical block. Apparently,
neither the judges in Cowlitz County nor the attorneys felt that the
slight change of position taken by the Washington State Bar Association
in late 1960 was sufficient to eliminate the problem and to permit city
attorneys, and particularly their partners and associates, to accept
appointments by the court to represent indigent persons accused of
crime in either superior or justice of the peace courts.5
cases. For an excellent and succinct explanation of this new federal policy see Shafroth,
The New Criminal Justice Act, 50 A.B.A.J. 1049 (1964). For proposals as to implementation see Report, supra note 50.
57 It is believed that the reference is to Wash. State Bar Assoc. Op. 68, on the matter
of City Attorneys of Third Class cities accepting the defense of criminal actions, which
was based upon the A.B.A. Op. 34 (Mar. 3, 1931). (A third class city is one having
at least 1500 inhabitants. RCW 35.01.030.)
58 See Wash. State Bar Assoc. Op. 112, in 14 WASH. STATE BAR NEWS 58, 62 (Dec.

1960). The opinion is based upon a modification of the earlier A.B.A. opinion and
recognizes an exception under circumstances where the defendant would otherwise find
it difficult or impossible to secure counsel. The opinion does not take into account the
burden imposed on other members of the bar by the disqualification of the city attorney
and his associates, nor does it stress and distinguish, as it might, the difference between
the representation of persons accused of crime for a consideration and representation
of indigents at the request and under the supervision and control of the court. In A.B.A.
Op. 55 (Dec. 14, 1931), it was expressly stated that Op. 34, see note 57 supra, did not
apply to the defense of indigent prisoners. It would seem, in the light of the growing
burden on attorneys in this area, that a review of these two Washington opinions is in
order.
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For serious or complicated cases, such as murders or insanity pleas,
most judges make special provision in some manner, either by appointing an experienced attorney, or by appointing two, one with
considerable criminal experience, and another younger attorney for
the leg work. Judges from five counties indicated that they did not
make special provision for a serious case. The reason is obvious. The
largest of the five counties has only thirty-nine lawyers and most of
them have some criminal practice. In Kittitas County the three attorneys selected for assignment handle virtually all the criminal work
of the county and are experienced counsel for the occasional serious
case, "about one every four years."
Only one judge indicated that attorneys asked to be excused from
appointments to defend indigents more than ten percent of the time,
and most of these requests were for good cause. 9 Several indicated
they had never been presented with such a request, and another indicated "we do not entertain such requests." Yet, when requests are
made for good cause, the judges' answers indicated that they are
invariably granted. This was not a problem in Washington in 1963,
but it may well become one in the future as the burden of defense
imposed by recent United States Supreme Court decisions takes the
need for counsel back to the accusatorial stage.6"
Stage of the Proceedings for Appointment of Counsel. The most
significant difference of opinion among the judges, prosecutors, and
defense attorneys involved the time suggested for appointment of counsel. Since this was the only point of significant difference of opinion
among the three groups, the phrasings of the particular questions are
of some importance and are set out in the footnotes.6
59
60 CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 4, 5, RCW vol. 0.Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) and
478 (1964).
61 Judges and prosecutors were asked the following questions:
101. a. Under an ideal system, at what stage in a criminal case do you think the
indigent person should first be provided with a lawyer if he wants one?
1. Between arrest and first appearance before a magistrate.
2. At first appearance before a magistrate.
3. Between first appearance and preliminary hearing.
4. At preliminary hearing.
5. After preliminary hearing but before the filing of an indictment or information.
6. After the filing of an indictment or information but before arraignment thereon.
7. At arraignment on indictment or information.
8. After arraignment on indictment.
9. At trial.
10. Other (state below).
(Ed. note: Because the questions were prepared for a national survey, all categories are not applicable in Washington or any particular state)
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All but two of the judges contacted by questionnaire felt that appointment of counsel should be at an earlier stage than at present6 2
All of the judges interviewed also agreed that appointment should be
earlier." One indicated that there was no more "critical stage" than
the time of arrest, and that counsel should most appropriately be made
available at that time. Three others thought that the appointment
should be made between arrest and first appearance, thereby allowing
the police some time to talk to the defendant. Two of the remaining
three felt that counsel should be appointed at the first appearance; the
third indicated that "speaking as a former deputy prosecutor, the case
couldn't be processed if the lawyers get in the case too early," and
suggested the preliminary hearing as the appropriate stage for appointment of counsel. He was the only one of the seven judges interviewed
who felt that lack of counsel at the stage he selected would not be unfair. Eleven of the seventeen judges, responding to the mail questionnaire, indicated that counsel should be appointed at or prior to first
appearance, four suggested appointment at the preliminary hearing and
two chose the period after the filing of the information and before arraignment, the current practice. Twelve of the seventeen thought it
would be unfair if the defendant did not obtain counsel at the stage
selected by him for appointment under an ideal system; three thought
it would not be unfair at the stage he selected; and two said it depended upon the experience of the defendant. All but one thought the
procedure he suggested could be financed, although some recognized
that it would be an additional burden on the county. The financial
problem was mentioned often in the interviews with judges. (All the
comments must be interpreted in light of the 1963 practice of providing
no more than $25 or $50, $75 in Pierce County, for counsel in any case
unless the trial lasted more than one or two days.) With these statutory
limits upon compensation, appointment in all cases would not appear
to be an insurmountable financial burden. Finding a sufficient number
of lawyers to handle all cases would be another matter, however.
101. b. Do you think it is unfair to the indigent person if he does not get a lawyer
at this stage?
Defense attorneys were presented with the same list of nine alternatives, but were
asked to indicate at what stage they were appointed in the last case in which they
represented an indigent during the survey here in 1962. After selecting one of the
nine categories, defense attorneys were then asked, "were you appointed in time
to represent the accused person adequately ?"
62 See text at note 30 supra.
63 It should be remembered that the survey was conducted prior to the decisions in
Massiah and Escobedo.
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The responses of the prosecutors can be divided essentially into two
groups. Each of the twenty-eight responding, orally or by mail, considered the ideal system to be one which would best protect the accused
and thought that appointment should take place between arrest and
first appearance. Twelve selected either "after the filing of the information," or "at arraignment." Several others mentioned "at the first
appearance before a magistrate." Two of the six prosecutors interviewed selected the latter time, but indicated that the first appearance
in their county was usually, if not invariably, at the arraignment on
the information. Consequently, what originally appeared as two somewhat divergent views resolved themselves into two less disparate but
nevertheless distinctive views. Those who believe that counsel should
be appointed before the first appearance recognized that an accused's
rights will not be fully protected if counsel is not appointed almost
immediately upon arrest. The majority, selecting arraignment as the
time for appointment of counsel, tended to stress that the vast majority
of the defendants were guilty in fact and that, in many cases, they
would not be convicted if counsel were obtained too soon. In essence,
the status quo (in the more populous counties, i.e., King, Spokane,
and Yakima, usually involving arraignment or other court appearance
within twenty-four hours) was felt to be as fair a procedure as an accused was entitled to have.
Five of the twenty-eight prosecutors thought it not unfair if the defendant did not have the benefit of counsel at the stage he had selected
under an ideal system. Six prosecutors expressed doubt whether such
a system could be financed, but relying on our twenty-five dollars .per
day or per appearance statute, the majority felt that the added burden
would not be much of a problem.
Because no provision is made for payment of attorneys prior to arraignment in superior court in Washington, the vast majority of attorneys responding indicated that they had been appointed either at
arraignment or after the filing of the information and before arraignment. Seventy-five of the 101 indicated these two stages as the time
of their appointment, thirty-four indicating just before arraignment,
and forty-one at arraignment. Actually no significant difference is
presented by these two groups of answers. Appointment is usually
made when the defendant first appears in superior court, which may
be called arraignment by some attorneys, while others consider that
arraignment does not take place until a plea is entered. In addition
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to the seventy-five mentioned above, an additional ten indicated appointment at or before first appearance before a magistrate. In light
of the practice in the state, it is reasonable to believe that they also
meant at or just before arraignment, which is the usual first appearance." Of the remaining sixteen, eight indicated appointment prior
to the filing of the information, and eight after arraignment and before
trial.
On the important point, whether appointment was sufficiently early
to allow adequate representation of the accused, seventy-eight of the
ninety-eight responding attorneys answered in the affirmative. However, several of the seventy-eight indicated that, while their response
was affirmative regarding the technicalities of the defense, appointment
is of little value in anything but sentencing if the police and the prosecutor have already talked extensively with the accused." Understandably, several of the twenty negative responders concurred. The fact
that counsel might not be as happy with the situation as a majority
would indicate is borne out by the answers to the question regarding
whether the system is fair to indigents. Only fifty-eight said yes,
whereas forty said no to that question. Specifically, thirty-six attorneys
thought that counsel should be appointed at an earlier stage of the
proceedings, although few suggested exactly when that appointment
should be made.
Rate of Compensation. Compensation for the representation of indigents was stated to be inadequate by all but one judge contacted,
with numerous and varied adjectives and adverbs thrown in for emphasis. The one dissenter admitted that the statutory rates were inadequate, but stated that in his county they are stretched. Two other
judges dissented in part by indicating that they thought the $25 provided counsel where a defendant pleaded guilty was adequate. Every
judge who responded indicated that counsel should be reimbursed for
his out-of-pocket expenses. Some of the judges interviewed indicated
that it was their practice to allow reimbursement in one manner or
another. However, attorneys generally seemed to be unaware of this
practice. Apparently reimbursement is allowed only occasionally.
Turning to the views of prosecutors on this matter, an interesting
distinction appeared between the views of prosecutors who had been
64
Unless, of course, they were appointed at a preliminary hearing, under RCW Ch.
10.16. Preliminary Hearings. For present practice, see notes 18 and 19, supra.
65 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). The 1965 legislature agreed with the
majority. See, supra note 35.

19651

DEFENSE OF INDIGENT PERSONS

such less than ten years and those who had been in office for longer
periods. Every one of the newer prosecutors felt that the rates of
compensation were inadequate, whereas only half of the senior prosecutors agreed on this point. Among the prosecutors who believed that
compensation was adequate, all but one came from counties with populations of less than 40,000, and the largest county involved had a
1960 population of only 62,070. Every prosecutor who answered the
question indicated that counsel should be reimbursed for his out-ofpocket expenses.
Understandably, defense attorneys also thought that the rates of
compensation for their services were inadequate. In answer to the
question requesting recommended changes of procedure, eighty-five of
the 101 attorneys responding indicated that counsel should be paid
more for their services, and seventy-six thought that out-of-pocket
expenses should be paid, indicating by implication that at least that
number had received nothing in this regard. In fact, ninety-one of the
101 attorneys were compensated for their services. However, only
fifteen were compensated in full for their out-of-pocket expenses, and
an additional ten were compensated in part. In answer to the more
general question, only a third of the defense attorneys thought the
system fair to lawyers, while two out of three answered negatively. 8
Quality of Appointed Counsel. More than half of the Washington
lawyers appointed to represent indigents during the period of this
study had been in practice longer than ten years. In the smaller counties where appointed attorneys are regularly selected from the entire
bar membership this is quite normal, but, surprisingly, in King County
where appointments are made from among those who indicate a willingness to serve the same pattern prevails.
Because attorneys for indigents generally are selected from the bar
at large, all but three judges felt that appointed counsel were equal to
retained counsel. Two felt that appointed counsel did not do as well.
One indicated that they give better service than retained counsel. The
latter judge mentioned that appointed counsel have no hidden economic
motives, and other judges nodded agreement when this point was
66 The attention of attorneys appointed to defend indigents is directed to Judge William G. East's opinion in Dillon v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 487 (D. Ore. 1964).
in which the court in granting relief to the lawyer applied the theory of government
taking of the lawyer's services for public use. See, Note, 16 HAST. L. J. 274 (1964).

See also, Ervin, Uncompensated Counsel: They Do Not Meet the ConstitutionalMandate, 49 A.B.A.J. 435 (1963) and Mazor, supranote 44, at 83. But see, State v. Johnson,
64 Wn2d 625, 628, 393 P.2d 284, 286 (1964).
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suggested. Similar results appear in the comparison of appointed
counsel with prosecutors. Only two judges, responding by mail, thought
that appointed counsel were not as good as the prosecutor and his
staff, while two who were interviewed thought that appointed counsel
were better. Often they are ex-deputy prosecutors who left that office
once they had acquired some confidence. One judge requested that
his original outburst regarding the incompetency of most deputy prosecutors be tempered to an indication that retained counsel compared
"very favorably." Some judges, of course, mentioned the tremendous
advantage that the prosecuting authority has in the investigative stages.
As previously indicated, the only judicial district that has set up a
defender program had not, at the time of this survey, had an opportunity to operate under it. The judge from that district indicated that the
part-time defender who had been6 selected
had had less experience than
7
the prosecutors in those counties.
The prosecuting attorneys felt that assigned counsel were generally
equal to retained counsel. Two or three felt that assigned counsel were
better than many counsel who were retained, stating that assigned
counsel were more conscientious or experienced. Two or three felt
them to be less qualified than retained counsel."
Seven attorneys indicated no criminal practice prior to their first appointment in 1962, and an additional twenty-three indicated less than
ten prior criminal cases. Several of these thirty qualified this with the
comment that they meant criminal defense; they had been deputy
prosecutors. At the other extreme, twenty-four indicated that they
had had more than fifty previous criminal cases.
The most common number of appointments per attorney was two,
thirty-six of the 101 who responded indicating that number. Twentyeight responders indicated that they had been appointed in more than
three cases, and one attorney received thirty appointments. All of
those who indicated appointment to more than nine cases each came
from King County. Two attorneys in each of Cowlitz and Yakima
Counties indicated appointment in six to nine cases, as did one attorney
in Kitsap County. One Kittitas County attorney was appointed in six
cases, whereas the largest number of cases allocated to any Spokane
attorney was two. Fifteen attorneys indicated that they had repreSee text supra at p. 83.
With respect to the incompetency of appointed counsel as grounds for a new trial
see, State v. Davis, 53 Wn.2d 387, 333 P.2d 1089 (1959), and State v. Mode, 57 Wn2d
829, 360 P.2d 159 (1961).
67
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sented defendants who had been charged with crimes punishable by
death or life imprisonment during 1962 in a total of twenty cases.
Miscellaneous Items and Summary Comments. One question directed to prosecutors which produced some variant answers was the
following: "Do you disclose to defense counsel such things as confessions, statements of witnesses, reports of expert witnes~es, exhibits,
etc.? Please specify those things you do disclose and those you do not."
Twelve of the twenty-eight prosecutors indicated that they usually disclose everything in their files as a matter of course; three others indicated that they do so if a request is made; ten others indicated that
they disclose some things, i.e., confessions, coroners reports, but not
witnesses' statements, and other items which might be considered the
"work product" of the prosecution. One prosecutor in this group
summed up his policy by saying that he "turned over the items which
come from the defendant himself." Several of those who hold some
things back indicated that it depends a lot on the attitude of defense
counsel. If he has been cooperative in the past, he stands a greater
chance of receiving similar cooperation from the prosecutor. Another
prosecutor who prefers to hold some things back comments that "A
defendant can get virtually anything on motion; the courts don't
exercise their discretion at all." 9 Another comment illustrative of an
idea mentioned more than once was "As I get more experience, I turn
over more and more. It's easier to dispose of a case.by disclosing."
Two distinctive positions also were represented in the replies. One
prosecutor disclosed none of the items listed, and two indicated that
everything was disclosed to appointed counsel but that some items were
held back from retained counsel."0 In their summary comments, three
prosecutors suggested that a public defender system should be adopted;
three felt that appointed attorneys should be better compensated, both
for their time and out-of-pocket expenses; two felt that the Washington procedures should be altered to allow earlier appointment; three
felt that some steps should be taken to force the defendant who has
appointed counsel, but who has funds, to assign his funds or compensate
counsel in some manner.
00 For an excellent discussion of pre-trial discovery in criminal cases see, Fletcher,
PretrialDiscovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. RE~v. 293 (1960). For the present Washington picture, in law and in practice, see Comment, 39 WAsH. L. REv. 853
(1964).
Prosecuting attorneys should study: Note, 15 STAN. L. Rnv. 700 (1963). And see,
State
v. Grove, 65 Wn2d 508, 511-12, 398 P2d 170, 172-73 (1965).
70
The duty of the prosecutor is spelled out in CANoNs OF PRoFEssioNAI ETRics 5,
RCW Vol. 0.
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Similarly, a few judges added general comments. Several indicated
that a public defender system should be instituted. Another, that some
means should be found to appoint lawyers from outside the county
where it would be advisable, i.e., the practice of a small county lawyer
can be seriously hurt by a criminal defense if the crime has inflamed
the local citizenry. The county in question has slightly less than 11,000
population and only six attorneys who are not associated with the firm
of which the prosecutor is a member, and two of these six are not active
practitioners.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

At the time this report was submitted to the American Bar Foundation, in November of 1963, the authors' conclusions and recommendations were those stated below. To the extent that they have been
implemented, the original survey will have served its purpose. To the
extent that they have not, hopefully this broader dissemination of the
essence of the report will be of assistance in accomplishing that end.
In order to fully protect an accused's substantive rights, provision
should be made for earlier appointment of consel. The main stumbling
block under the current practice is the statutory requirement which
provides for the appointment of counsel upon arraignment in superior
court, and for compensation in connection with that appointment.
There being no specific provision for earlier appointment or compensation, it is only on rare occasions that counsel is appointed at an earlier
stage of the proceedings.
Funds for the defense of indigents should be increased, not only to
provide adequate compensation for counsel's services, but also to cover
his out-of-pocket expenses. Although several suggestions were made
that a public defender system should be adopted, the quality of current
representation is generally felt to be equal to that supplied by retained
counsel. Thus the additional funds could be used either to staff and
service a public defender system, or to compensate more fully the
counsel now selected under the appointive counsel system. Under
either system, funds for investigatory and other out-of-pocket expenses,
and for counsel's services in prolonged trials, appear to be the major
requirement to bring the current system up to an efficiently functioning
level.
If the current system of appointed counsel is continued, a manual,
setting forth the responsibilities of appointed counsel, the steps which
should be taken or considered in behalf of the accused, and the services
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available to counsel in preparing for trial, should be prepared and
distributed to all attorneys on the list.' In addition it should cover
such items as the procedure to be followed if counsel discovers after
his appointment that the accused has sufficient funds to compensate
counsel, and the fact that compensation may be paid for work on appeals (although the statute on its face makes no specific provision for
such compensation). This recommendation, if implemented, will assure
a more uniform practice throughout the state. Further it will obviate
the dilemma currently facing judges when they sign the order for
counsel's compensation, either to approve the inadequate statutory
compensation, or to violate the letter of the law in order to compensate
counsel adequately.
A uniform reporting system should be developed, at least throughout
Washington, so that meaningful statistics can be collected."2 This applies to everything from docket books and entries to budgetary and
bookkeeping entries.
7 See, LAw Am TACTICS IN FEDERAL CRmsINAL CASES (1964), and CALIFoR-NA
CR=iTNAL
LAW PRA TiCE, CAL. PRAcTIcE HA-Doo No. 23 (1964).
2

7 The Administrator for the Courts, established by RCW Ch. 2.56, has the authority,
but lacks the manpower, to do the job. The essential funds should be appropriated so
that the Administrator could carry out his responsibilities with his usual efficiency and

tact.

